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Abstract
The problem of computing optimal network tolls that induce a Nash equilibrium of minimum
total cost has been studied intensively in the literature, but mostly under the assumption that
these tolls are unrestricted. Here we consider this problem under the more realistic assumption
that the tolls have to respect some given upper bound restrictions on the arcs. The problem of
taxing subnetworks optimally constitutes an important special case of this problem. We study
the restricted network toll problem for both non-atomic and atomic (unweighted and weighted)
players; our studies are the first that also incorporate heterogeneous players, i.e., players with
different sensitivities to tolls.
For non-atomic and heterogeneous players, we prove that the problem is NP-hard even for
single-commodity networks and affine latency functions. We therefore focus on parallel-arc net-
works and give an algorithm for optimally taxing subnetworks with affine latency functions. For
weighted atomic players, the problem is NP-hard already for parallel-arc networks and linear
latency functions, even if players are homogeneous. In contrast, for unweighted atomic and
homogeneous players, we develop an algorithm to compute optimal restricted tolls for parallel-
arc networks and arbitrary (standard) latency functions. Similarly, for unweighted atomic and
heterogeneous players, we derive an algorithm for optimally taxing subnetworks for parallel-arc
networks and arbitrary (standard) latency functions.
The key to most of our results is to derive (combinatorial) characterizations of flows that are
inducible by restricted tolls. These characterizations might be of independent interest.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems; G.1.6 Optim-
ization; G.2.1 Combinatorics; G.2.2 Graph Theory
Keywords and phrases Network routing games, coordination mechanisms, network tolls, taxing
subnetworks, heterogeneous players
1 Introduction
Motivation and Background. It is a well-known fact that selfish route choices in network
routing applications result in outcomes that are undesirable for the society as a whole. In
urban road traffic, for example, selfish route choices lead to unnecessary traffic jams, thereby
causing environmental pollution, waste of natural resources, time and money. The Texas
A&M Transportation Institute states in its 2012 Urban Mobility Report [13, page 1]: “The
2011 data are consistent with one past trend, congestion will not go away by itself — action
is needed! [...] The problem is very large. In 2011, congestion caused urban Americans
to travel 5.5 billion hours more and to purchase an extra 2.9 billion gallons of fuel for a
congestion cost of $121 billion.”
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Road pricing is recognized to be one of the most effective means to reduce congestion in
networks. The idea is to let the users pay for the usage of certain segments of the network by
imposing tolls. Typically, such tolls incite the users to change their commuting behavior, e.g.,
by opting for alternative, possibly slightly longer routes, avoiding certain parts of the network
at peak hours, etc. As a result, the network becomes less congested because the traffic is
better distributed through the network. Currently, road pricing systems are implemented
successfully in several large cities across the world (like in Singapore, Kopenhagen, Tel Aviv,
London, Dubai, etc.). A fundamental problem in this context is to determine tolls such that
the overall congestion of the underlying network is reduced.
In this paper, we study the problem of computing optimal tolls for the arcs of a given
network that induce a Nash equilibrium of minimum total cost. This problem has been
studied intensively in the literature for decades. One of the earliest articles addressing this
problem is due to Beckman, McGuire and Winsten [1], where they show that marginal
cost tolls induce an optimal flow as Nash equilibrium in non-atomic network routing games.
However, most previous studies were conducted under the assumption that the tolls are
unrestricted. This assumption is too simplistic in many situations and significantly limits
the applicability of such tolls in practice. For example, by using marginal cost tolls we lose
the ability to control which arcs of the network are tolled and by how much. Clearly, this is
undesirable in real-world applications where one can impose tolls only on certain arcs of the
network and wants to ensure that they do not exceed predefined amounts.
Only recently, researchers have started to investigate more refined network toll problems
like the taxing subnetworks problem [8, 10], in which only a subset of the arcs can be tolled,
or the restricted network toll problem [2], in which tolls have to respect some upper bound
restrictions on the arcs. All three studies [2, 8, 10] focus on the case of non-atomic players
that are homogeneous, i.e., all players are assumed to have equal sensitivities to tolls. Here
we further advance these investigations.
Our Contributions. We study the restricted network toll problem [2] both for non-
atomic and atomic (unweighted and weighted) players. In our studies we consider for the
first time also the case of heterogenous players, i.e., players may have different sensitivities
to tolls. Capturing heterogenous players is particularly important if it comes to applications
where users experience different disutilities of travel time and monetary cost (due to the
tolls). As it turns out, the heterogenous player case gives rise to several new challenges in
devising algorithms for the computation of optimal restricted tolls.
The main contributions presented in this paper are as follows:
In Section 3 we consider the case of non-atomic, heterogeneous players. We prove that
the problem of computing optimal restricted tolls is NP-hard even for single-commodity
networks with affine latency functions. In light of this negative result, we then focus
on parallel-arc networks and derive a combinatorial characterization of flows that are
inducible by restricted tolls. Exploiting this characterization, we derive an optimal
algorithm for taxing subnetworks with affine latency functions.
In Section 4 we consider atomic players. We first observe that for weighted players the
problem of computing optimal restricted tolls is NP-hard already for parallel-arc networks
with linear latency functions (even if the players are homogeneous). We therefore focus
on unweighted players and parallel-arc networks with standard latency functions and
derive an optimal algorithm to compute restricted tolls for homogeneous players. Further,
we obtain an optimal algorithm for taxing subnetworks for heterogeneous players.
As in previous works [2, 8, 10], most of our exact algorithms work only for parallel-arc
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networks. However, our studies also reveal that this is basically unavoidable, unless one
is willing to resort to approximation algorithms (assuming that P 6= NP). Moreover, from
a practical point of view the restricted network toll problem for parallel-arc networks is
still very well motivated: for example, it captures the problem of pricing fast-lanes (or
priority-lanes) of highways that can be used to bypass heavy traffic (like in Tel-Aviv).
Our Techniques. The main difficulty that we face here in designing algorithms to
compute optimal restricted tolls is that the underlying problem is a bi-level optimization
problem: the feasible tolls constitute a compact set over which we wish to optimize the cost
of the corresponding Nash equilibria (which in turn are determined by the tolls). Typically,
such bi-level optimization problems are hard to tackle.
The key to most of our algorithmic results is to derive characterizations of flows that are
inducible by restricted tolls. For the unrestricted case, several such characterizations can be
found in the literature (see, e.g., [4, 6, 9, 15]). Moreover, some of them can be adapted to also
incorporate upper bound restrictions on tolls. For example, Fleischer et al. [6] characterize
the inducibility of a flow for non-atomic, heterogeneous players by the existence of an optimal
solution satisfying certain minimality conditions for a cleverly chosen linear program. The
upper bound restrictions can easily be added to this LP formulation such that the same
characterization continues to hold. However, the crux is that we cannot simply use this
characterization here because it reveals very little about the structure of the flows that are
inducible by these restricted tolls. In contrast, we derive characterizations that reveal some
structural properties of the inducible flows which we then exploit to design our algorithms.
Related Work. Beckman, McGuire and Winsten [1] proved that for non-atomic,
homogeneous players marginal cost tolls induce an optimal flow as a Nash equilibrium.
The existence of such tolls for non-atomic, heterogeneous players has first been established
for single-commodity networks by Cole, Dodis and Roughgarden [4] and then extended to
multi-commodity networks by Yang and Huang [15] (see also the independent works by
Fleischer, Jain and Mahdian [6] and Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [9]). Fleischer [5] shows
that for single-commodity networks linear tolls (in terms of the maximum latency of the
optimal flow) are sufficient to enforce an optimal flow as Nash equilibrium.
In the literature one distinguishes between tolls that are weakly-optimal, i.e., at least one
induced Nash equilibrium is an optimal flow, and strongly-optimal, i.e., every induced Nash
equilibrium is an optimal flow. Swamy [14] proved the existence of weakly-optimal tolls for
atomic, heterogeneous players and splittable flow. For atomic, homogeneous players and
unsplittable flow, Caragiannis, Kaklamanis and Kanellopoulos [3] show that for linear latency
functions strongly-optimal tolls do not exist for multi-commodity networks or if the players
are weighted. They also show that strongly-optimal tolls exist for parallel-arc networks
with linear latency functions and unweighted players. Subsequently, Fotakis and Spirakis [7]
proved that weakly-optimal tolls can be computed efficiently for single-commodity networks
and that these tolls are strongly-optimal for series-parallel networks.
In this paper, we focus on the computation of weakly optimal tolls. Most related to our
work are the recent articles [2, 8, 10]. As already mentioned, these studies concentrate on the
case of non-atomic players that are homogeneous. Hoefer, Olbrich and Skopalik [8] study the
problem of optimally taxing subnetworks. They show that this problem is NP-hard for two-
commodity networks and affine latency functions by a non-trivial reduction from partition.
We borrow several insights of their proof to establish NP-hardness for single-commodity
networks and affine latency functions in the case of heterogeneous, non-atomic players here.
They also derive an algorithm to compute optimal tolls for parallel-arc networks and affine
latency functions. Recently, Kleinert et al. [10] extended the algorithm in [8] for optimally
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taxing subnetworks for parallel-arc networks to more general latency functions. The algorithm
guarantees polynomial running time for instances satisfying the inverse concavity property
(see [10] for details). The restricted network toll problem considered here was introduced
by Bonifaci, Salek and Schäfer [2]. The authors show that optimal restricted tolls can be
computed efficiently for parallel-arc networks and affine latency functions and also derive
bounds on the efficiency of restricted tolls for multi-commodity networks and polynomial
latency functions.
2 Preliminaries
We provide formal definitions of the concepts introduced in the Introduction. Suppose
we are given an instance I = (G = (V,A), (`a)a∈A, (si, ti)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) of the non-atomic
network routing game, where G is a directed graph with latency functions (`a)a∈A and k
commodities (si, ti)i∈[k] of demand (ri)i∈[k]. The goal of every player is to send his flow
along a shortest latency path from its source si to its destination ti. Let Pi denote the set of
all simple directed si, ti-paths in G and define P := ∪i∈[k]Pi. An outcome of the game is a
flow f : [k]× P → R+ that is feasible, i.e.,
∑
P∈Pi f
i
P = ri for every i ∈ [k]. Given a flow f ,
the total flow on arc a ∈ A is defined as fa :=
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈P:a∈P f
i
P . The set of arcs used by
commodity i is denoted by A+i and we define A+ = ∪i∈[k]A+i . We define the latency of a
path P ∈ P with respect to f as `P (f) :=
∑
a∈P `a(fa). The total cost C(f) of f is given
by its average latency, i.e., C(f) :=
∑
P∈P fP `P (f). A flow that minimizes C(·) is called
optimal and denoted by f∗. A feasible flow f is called a Nash flow (or Wardrop flow) with
respect to ` := (`a)a∈A if
∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, f iP > 0 : `P (f) ≤ `P ′(f) ∀P ′ ∈ Pi. (1)
Atomic network routing games are very similar. The only difference to the non-atomic
setting is that the flow for each commodity has to be routed along a single path, i.e.,
∀i ∈ [k], ∃!P ∈ Pi such that f iP = ri. What is refered to as commodity i ∈ [k] in the
non-atomic setting, is considered a player of weight ri in the atomic setting. (Note that
we do not assume that the commodities are distinct. Thus, different players might have
the same source and destination.) A flow can be regarded as a mapping from [k] into P.
On parallel arc networks, a(i) may be used to denote the arc player i uses in a given flow.
Players are said to be unweighted if ri = 1 for all i ∈ [k]. In the atomic setting, a feasible
flow is a Nash flow when
∀i ∈ [k], ∀P ∈ Pi, fP > 0 :
∑
a∈P
`a(fa) ≤
∑
a∈P ′
`a(fa + ri) ∀P ′ ∈ Pi. (2)
Throughout this paper, we assume that the latency functions are non-negative, non-
decreasing, differentiable and semi-convex, i.e., x · `a(x) is convex for every arc a ∈ A; such
latency functions are also called standard [11]. In the non-atomic setting, the cost of a Nash
flow is unique if the latency functions are standard; this property is not guaranteed to hold
for atomic players.
We study the restricted network toll problem as introduced in [2]: We are given an instance
I of the network routing game and threshold values θ := (θa)a∈A on the arcs. The goal is to
determine non-negative tolls τ := (τa)a∈A for the arcs of the network that obey the bounds
defined by the threshold functions (θa)a∈A. More formally, a toll vector τ = (τa)a∈A is called
θ-restricted if for every arc a ∈ A, 0 ≤ τa ≤ θa. Additionally, we are given a non-negative
vector of player sensitivities (also called types) α := (αi)i∈[k]. αi represents the fraction
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of how a player of type i values the cost of one unit of time (latency) compared to one
unit of money (toll).1 Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αk
throughout this paper. When αi = αj for all i, j ∈ [k], we say the players are homogeneous
with respect to their sensitivity to toll; otherwise, we call them heterogeneous. In the former
case, we can assume without loss of generality that α is normalized to 1.
Given a feasible flow f , we define the combined cost that a player of type i experiences
by traversing arc a ∈ A as φia(fa) = `a(fa) + αiτa(fa). The goal of a player of type i is to
choose a path P that minimizes the combined cost `P (f) + αiτP , where τP :=
∑
a∈P τa. For
θ-restricted tolls τ , let fτ denote a Nash flow that is induced by τ , i.e., fτ is a Nash flow
with respect to the combined costs (φi)i∈[k]. Given the restrictions θ = (θa)a∈A on the arcs, a
θ-restricted toll vector τ is optimal if there exists a Nash flow fτ that is inducible by τ whose
cost satisfies C(fτ ) ≤ C(f τ¯ ) for all Nash flows f τ¯ that are inducible by θ-restricted tolls τ¯ .
The optimization problem that we are considering in this paper is to compute θ-restricted
tolls that are optimal.
An important special case of the θ-restricted network toll problem is the so-called taxing
subnetworks problem [8]. Here we are given a set T ⊆ A of arcs that are taxable arbitrarily
while the arcs in N := A \ T are non-taxable. This problem is equivalent to setting θa =∞
for every a ∈ T and θa = 0 for every a ∈ N .
3 Non-Atomic Players
We focus on the non-atomic, heterogeneous player case in this section. We first prove that the
problem of computing optimal θ-restricted tolls is NP-hard for single-commodity networks.
I Theorem 1. The problem of deciding whether there exist θ-restricted tolls that induce a
flow of social cost at most K is NP-complete, even for single-commodity networks and affine
latency functions with non-atomic and heterogeneous players.
Our proof is an adaptation of the NP-hardness result for taxing subnetworks for two-
commodity instance, affine latency functions and homogeneous players presented in [8]. The
idea is to ‘mimic’ the behavior of their two-commodity instance by a single-commodity
instance. To this aim, we have to overcome several difficulties. The proof is involved and
due to lack of space deferred to the full version of the paper.
In light of Theorem 1, we subsequently restrict our attention to parallel-arc networks.
We first establish a combinatorial characterization of inducible flows which we then use to
derive an optimal algorithm for taxing subnetworks.
3.1 Characterization for Parallel-Arc Networks
We present a characterization of flows that are inducible by θ-restricted tolls in parallel-arc
networks. Our approach is algorithmic: We first derive an algorithm for computing tolls
that induce a given flow without any restrictions. We then show that the computed tolls
are component-wise minimal and use this insight to derive our final characterization. Our
characterization holds for arbitrary latency functions.
We assume that we have k different player types. Let f = (f i)i∈[k] be a given flow, where
f i is the flow of player type i. Note that if f is fixed then all latencies of the arcs become
1 Note that players having the same source and destination might still have different sensitivities in our
setting because we do not assume that the commodities are distinct.
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Algorithm 1: Computation of flow-inducing tolls
Input: flow f =
∑
i∈[k] f
i
Output: tolls τ = (τa)a∈A inducing f
1 τ ← 0
2 for a = 2→ m+ do
3 ∆a ← `a−`a−1αˆmin(a)
4 for a¯ = 1→ (a− 1) do τa¯ ← τa¯ + ∆a
5 end
6 return τ
constants. For notational convenience, we will therefore omit the reference to f and write
`a to refer to `a(fa). Throughout this section we assume that A = [m] and that the arcs
are ordered such that `1 ≤ `2 ≤ · · · ≤ `m. This is without loss of generality because we can
always relabel the arcs accordingly.
Let m+ = max{a ∈ A+} be the arc of largest latency that is used under f . For every
arc a ∈ A we define L(a) := {a′ ∈ A | a′ ≥ a} as the set of arcs that succeed a in the
order above (including a). Note that the latency of every arc in L(a) is at least `a. We
use αˆmin(a) to refer to the minimal sensitivity of a player that uses an arc in L(a), i.e.,
αˆmin(a) = min{αi | A+i ∩ L(a) 6= ∅}; we adopt the convention that αˆmin(a) =∞ if no such
player exists.
Algorithm 1 describes the computation of a toll vector τ inducing f . We first establish
some properties of this algorithm. It will turn to be convenient to view the algorithm as
operating in phases, where a phase corresponds to the execution of the outer for-loop (Lines
2–5) for a fixed a ∈ {2, . . . ,m+}.
I Lemma 2. Let τ be the toll vector computed by Algorithm 1. Then for every two arcs
aˆ, aˇ ∈ A with aˆ ≥ aˇ it holds τaˇ − τaˆ =
∑aˆ
a=aˇ+1
`a−`a−1
αˆmin(a) .
Proof. Note that τaˇ and τaˆ remain zero during phases a = 2, . . . , aˇ and are increased by the
same amount ∆a in phases a = aˆ+ 1, . . . ,m+. In phase a ∈ {aˇ+ 1, . . . , aˆ}, τaˇ is increased
by ∆a, while τaˆ remains zero. The claim follows from the definition of ∆a = `a−`a−1αˆmin(a) . J
The following theorem gives a characterization of flows that are inducible by unrestricted
tolls.
I Theorem 3. A flow f = (f i)i∈[k] of non-atomic, heterogeneous players with sensitivities
0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αm is inducible by unrestricted tolls if and only if
∀i, j ∈ [k] with αi > αj , ∀a ∈ A+i , ∀a¯ ∈ A+j : `a ≥ `a¯. (3)
Intuitively, the above condition states that a flow is inducible if more sensitive players
are routed on arcs with larger latencies.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that f is inducible and (3) does not hold, i.e.,
there exist i, j ∈ [k] with αi > αj and arcs a ∈ A+i , a¯ ∈ A+j such that `a < `a¯. Note that f
is a Nash flow with respect to the combined costs because it is inducible. Since a ∈ A+i and
a¯ ∈ A+j , we have
`a + αiτa ≤ `a¯ + αiτa¯ or, equivalently, `a¯ − `a ≥ αi (τa − τa¯) . (4)
`a¯ + αjτa¯ ≤ `a + αjτa or, equivalently, `a¯ − `a ≤ αj (τa − τa¯) . (5)
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Note that `a¯ − `a > 0 by assumption and αj > 0. Inequality (5) therefore implies that
τa − τa¯ > 0. Combining (4) and (5), we obtain αj (τa − τa¯) ≥ αi (τa − τa¯) . Dividing both
sides by τa − τa¯ > 0 leads to a contradiction because αj < αi by assumption.
Now suppose that (3) holds. We show that f is inducible by the tolls τ computed by
Algorithm 1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that f is not a Nash flow with respect to
the combined cost. Then for some player i there exist arcs a ∈ A+i and a¯ ∈ A satisfying
`a + αiτa > `a¯ + αiτa¯ or, equivalently, `a − `a¯ > αi(τa¯ − τa). (6)
Let aˇ = min{a, a¯} and aˆ = max{a, a¯}. By Lemma 2, the difference in toll is
τaˇ − τaˆ =
aˆ∑
a′=aˇ+1
`a′ − `a′−1
αˆmin(a′)
. (7)
Recall that αˆmin(a′) = min{αj | A+j ∩ L(a′) 6= ∅}. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: a¯ ≤ a. We have aˆ = a ∈ A+i and thus a ∈ L(a′) for every a′ ∈ {aˇ + 1, . . . , aˆ}.
As a consequence, αˆmin(a′) ≤ αi. Now (7) implies that αi(τa¯ − τa) ≥ `a − `a¯, which is a
contradiction to (6).
Case 2: a¯ > a. We have aˇ = a ∈ A+i . Note that by assumption all arcs in A+j ∩ L(a′)
satisfy αj ≥ αi for every a′ ∈ {aˇ + 1, . . . , aˆ}. Thus, αˆmin(a′) ≥ αi and (7) implies that
αi(τa − τa¯) ≤ `a¯ − `a, which is a contradiction to (6). J
The following lemma is crucial in order to obtain our characterization of flows that are
inducible by θ-restricted tolls.
I Lemma 4. Let f be an inducible flow. Then the tolls τ computed by Algorithm 1 are
component-wise minimal tolls that induce f .
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that τ is not component-wise minimal, i.e., there
exists a toll vector τ ′ which induces f and τ ′a < τa for some arc a ∈ A. Choose a¯ ∈ A as the
arc with largest latency such that τ ′a¯ < τa¯. Note that the toll that Algorithm 1 imposes on
arc m+ ∈ A+ is τm+ = 0. Because τa¯ > 0 there must exist at least one arc in A+ whose
latency is strictly larger than `a¯. Let aˆ ∈ A+ be an arc which has minimal latency among
such arcs, i.e.,
aˆ = arg min{`a | a ∈ A+, `a > `a¯}.
Let i be the least toll sensitive player that uses arc aˆ. By Lemma 2, τa¯ − τaˆ = `aˆ−`a¯αi . Note
that for player i the combined costs of aˆ and a¯ are equal because
φiaˆ(τ) = `aˆ + αiτaˆ = `a¯ + αiτaˆ + αi
(
`aˆ − `a¯
αi
)
= `a¯ + αiτa¯ = φia¯(τ).
Further, φia¯(τ ′) < φia¯(τ) because τ ′a¯ < τa¯. Because f is a Nash flow with respect to τ ′ it
follows that φiaˆ(τ ′) ≤ φia¯(τ ′). Therefore, φiaˆ(τ ′) ≤ φia¯(τ ′) < φia¯(τ) = φiaˆ(τ). This implies that
τ ′aˆ < τaˆ which is a contradiction to the choice of a¯. J
I Theorem 5. A flow f = (f i)i∈[k] for non-atomic, heterogeneous players with sensitivities
0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αm is inducible by θ-restricted tolls if and only if
1. ∀i, j ∈ [k] with αi > αj, ∀a ∈ A+i , ∀a¯ ∈ A+j : `a ≥ `a¯.
2. ∀a ∈ A: θa ≥ τa, where τ is the toll vector computed by Algorithm 1 for f .
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Proof. Let f be inducible by θ-restricted tolls τ ′. Clearly, f is also inducible by unrestricted
tolls and the first condition therefore follows by Theorem 3. Let τ be the toll vector computed
by Algorithm 1. Then f is also inducible by τ . By Lemma 4, we have τa ≤ τ ′a for every
arc a ∈ A because τ is component-wise minimal. Since τ ′ is θ-restricted we conclude that
τa ≤ τ ′a ≤ θa for every arc a ∈ A, which proves the second condition.
Next, suppose that Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Then f is inducible by unrestricted tolls
by Theorem 3. In particular, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that the tolls τ computed by
Algorithm 1 induce f . Condition 2 now establishes that τ is θ-restricted, which concludes
the proof. J
3.2 Taxing Subnetworks
Bonifaci, Salek and Schäfer [2] derive a polynomial-time algorithm for computing optimal
θ-restricted tolls for homogeneous, non-atomic players on parallel-arc networks with affine
latency functions. We show that this algorithm can be used to determine optimal tolls for
taxing subnetworks in the presence of heterogeneous players.
Suppose we are given an instance of the taxing subnetworks problem with affine latency
functions and k player classes with sensitivities (αi)i∈[k] and demands (ri)i∈[k]. Let T ⊆ A
and N := A \ T be the sets taxable and non-taxable arcs, respectively. Set r := ∑i∈[k] ri
and L = maxa∈A `a(r)−mina∈A `a(0). Note that for homogeneous players and parallel-arc
networks the maximum toll needed to induce a given flow is at most L. We can therefore
define an instance of the θ-restricted toll problem with θa = L for every a ∈ T and θa = 0 for
every a ∈ N . Now, compute an optimal θ-restricted toll vector τ for demand r by running
the algorithm in [2]. Let fτ = (fτa )a∈A be the resulting Nash flow. The idea now is to
turn the arc flow fτ = (fτa )a∈A into a player flow f = (f i)i∈[k] such that the properties of
Theorem 5 are satisfied. To this aim, we decompose fτ into k player flows f = (f i)i∈[k] in
such a way that more sensitive players are assigned flow from higher latency arcs. We call
this the canonical decomposition of fτ .
I Theorem 6. Let f = (f i)i∈[k] be the canonical decomposition of the flow fτ as described
above. Then f is an optimal θ-restricted flow.
Proof. Because fτ is inducible by θ-restricted tolls for homogeneous players, it holds that
for every a ∈ N and a¯ ∈ A+, `a(fa) ≥ `a¯(fa¯). In particular, all the arcs in N+ := N ∩ A+
have equal latencies and the latencies of arcs in N \ N+ are at least as large. Now, the
canonical decomposition guarantees that the resulting flow f satisfies (3) of Theorem 3. We
can thus use Algorithm 1 to generate tolls which induce f for heterogenous players (as in
the proof of Theorem 3). Further, these tolls will not impose any tolls on N because there
is no flow-carrying arc with a latency larger than the one in N+. Since fτa =
∑
i∈[k] f
i
a for
every a ∈ A, the total cost is not altered by this decomposition.
We next prove optimality. Let f = (fi)i∈[k] be an optimal flow inducible by θ-restricted
tolls for the game with heterogenous players. Consider the arc flow defined as fa :=
∑
i∈[k] f
i
a.
As before, we know that for every a ∈ N and a¯ ∈ A+, `a(fa) ≥ `a¯(fa¯). If N ∩A+ 6= ∅ then
the maximum latency arc that is used must be in N and all arcs in N have latencies at least
as large as this arc. Otherwise, N ∩A+ = ∅. In either case, we do not need to impose any
toll on the arcs in N to induce f . We conclude that f is also inducible by θ-restricted tolls
for homogeneous players. Thus, the total cost of an optimal flow inducible by θ-restricted
tolls for homogenous players is at most the cost of one for heterogeneous players. J
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm for optimal completion of inducible basis f0
Input: network ({s, t}, A, `), flow f0, demand d and latency cap L
Output: optimal flow f ≥ f0 such that `a(fa) ≤ L, if it exists
1 f ← f0
2 while d > 0 do
3 A¯← {a ∈ A | `a(fa + 1) ≤ L}
4 if A¯ = ∅ then return failure
5 a¯← arg mina∈A¯(fa + 1)`a(fa + 1)− fa`a(fa)
6 fa¯ ← fa¯ + 1
7 d← d− 1
8 end
4 Atomic Players
We turn to the problem of computing optimal θ-restricted tolls for parallel-arc networks
with atomic players. Roughgarden [12] proved that it is NP-hard to compute an optimal
flow for weighted atomic players in parallel-arc networks with linear latency functions. As
a consequence, computing optimal tolls is NP-hard in this setting, even for homogeneous
players and without restrictions on the tolls. We therefore assume that the players are
homogeneous and unweighted.
4.1 Characterization of flows inducible by θ-restricted tolls
We first derive a characterization of inducible flows for unweighted homogeneous players on
parallel arc networks.
I Lemma 7. A flow f of unweighted homomogeneous players on a parallel arc network
({s, t}, A) is inducible by θ-restricted tolls if and only if
`a(fa + 1) + θa ≥ `aˆ(faˆ) ∀a ∈ A, (8)
where aˆ := arg maxa∈A+ `a(fa).
Proof. Suppose that the restriction in Equation (8) holds. Then the tolls τ defined by
τa = max{0, `aˆ(faˆ)− `a(fa + 1)} are clearly non-negative and θ-restricted. Furthermore, for
any a ∈ A+ and a¯ ∈ A,
`a(fa) + τa ≤ max{`a(fa), `a(fa) + `aˆ(faˆ)− `a(fa + 1)}
≤ max{`a(fa), `aˆ(faˆ)} = `aˆ(faˆ) ≤ `a¯(fa¯ + 1) + τa¯.
This means no player has an incentive to change its choice. Suppose Equation (8) is not
satisfied. Then there is an arc a ∈ A such that `a(fa + 1) + θa < `aˆ(faˆ). Then for any
θ-restricted toll vector τ , `a(fa + 1) + τa < `aˆ(faˆ) + τaˆ. A player on arc aˆ will therefore want
to switch to arc a, which means that the flow is not inducible by θ-restricted tolls. J
4.2 Optimal θ-Restricted Tolls on Parallel-Arc Networks
We exploit the above characterization to obtain an optimal algorithm to compute θ-restricted
tolls for unweighted homogeneous players. The idea of the algorithm is to first guess the arc
aˆ ∈ A which is the maximum latency flow-carrying arc in a optimal solution and then the
amount i ∈ [k] of flow on it. We then compute for every other arc a ∈ A \ {aˆ} the minimum
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for finding an optimal flow inducible by θ-restricted tolls
Input: network ({s, t}, A, `, θ) and player count k
Output: optimal flow f∗ inducible by θ-restricted tolls
1 f∗ ← (k, . . . , k)
2 for aˆ ∈ A do
3 for i ∈ [k] do
4 f0aˆ ← i
5 d← k − i
6 for a ∈ A \ {aˆ} do
7 f0a ← min{n ∈ [k] | `a(n+ 1) + θa ≥ `aˆ(i)}
8 d← d− f0a
9 end
10 if d ≥ 0 and maxa∈A+ `a(f0a ) ≤ `aˆ(i) then
11 L← `aˆ(i)
12 f ← optimal completion of f0 (using Algorithm 2)
13 if flow completion succeeded and C(f) < C(f∗) then f∗ ← f
14 end
15 end
16 end
required flow such that Equation (8) is satisfied; call this flow the inducible basis f0. Every
flow that contains the inducible basis f0 is guaranteed to be inducible by θ-restricted tolls.
We can thus disregard the restrictions and complete f0 in the optimal way (as described in
Algorithm 2).
I Lemma 8. Algorithm 2 returns a flow which is cost minimal among all flows which contain
the inducible basis f0, ship d extra units and for which the latencies of used arcs do not
exceed L, if such a flow exists.
Proof. Suppose such a flow exists. We show that throughout the algorithm there exists
an optimal solution f∗ which has at least as much flow on each arc as the current flow f .
Consider the ith iteration of the algorithm. In this iteration the algorithm increases the flow
on a¯ by one. (Note that because an optimal solution exists, such an arc always exists.) By
our definition of A¯, the resulting latency is at most L. Now suppose there is no optimal
solution f∗ such that f∗a¯ ≥ fa¯. Then after iteration i− 1, there exists an optimal solution f∗
which ‘agreed’ with the algorithm’s flow and an arc a such that f∗a > fa. Then in this flow
f∗, if we move one unit of flow from a to a¯, the change in social cost would be
(f∗a¯ + 1)`a¯(f∗a¯ + 1)− f∗a¯ `a¯(f∗a¯ ) + (f∗a − 1)`a(f∗a − 1)− f∗a `a(f∗a ). (9)
By the choice of a¯ and the convexity of x · `a(x),
(f∗a¯ + 1)`a¯(f∗a¯ + 1)− f∗a¯ `a¯(f∗a¯ ) ≤ (f∗a¯ + 2)`a¯(f∗a¯ + 2)− (f∗a¯ + 1)`a¯(f∗a¯ + 1)
= (fa¯ + 1)fa¯(fa¯ + 1)− fa¯`a¯(fa¯)
≤ (fa + 1)fa(fa + 1)− fa`a(fa)
≤ f∗a `a(f∗a )− (f∗a − 1)`a(f∗a − 1).
So the change in the social cost (9) is non-positive. Therefore the optimal solution f∗ can be
altered without increasing the social cost so that it ‘agrees’ again with f , a contradiction. J
We summarize the algorithm for finding an optimal flow inducible by θ-restricted tolls in
Algorithm 3.
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I Theorem 9. Algorithm 3 finds in polynomial time a flow of minimum total cost which is
inducible by θ-restricted tolls.
Proof. Atomic network routing games with unweighted atomic players admit at least one
Nash equilibrium. Since the number of feasible flows is finite, there exists an optimal solution
f∗. Let aˆ be its maximum latency arc and i the flow on this arc. Consider the iteration of the
algorithm with the same choice of aˆ and i. The algorithm then puts as much flow on every
arc to ensure that it can stand its toll. Because f∗ is inducible under θ-restrictions, it must
ship at least as much flow on every arc. After this, the algorithm finds a cost-minimal flow of
d units on the arcs A \ {aˆ} with the added restriction that aˆ remains the maximum-latency
arc. Because of this restriction, the resulting flow remains inducible under θ-restrictions.
It does this by increasing flow on the arc in such a way that the increase in social cost is
minimized. This produces an optimal solution by Lemma 8. It is not hard to see that the
algorithm never outputs a flow which is not inducible by θ-restricted tolls. It puts as much
flow on every arc a such that it can stand its toll `aˆ(faˆ)− `a(fa + 1). If this requires more
flow than there is demand, the flow is discarded and will never be returned. J
I Remark. Note that once an optimal flow inducible by θ-restricted tolls is found we can
extract the respective tolls as described in the proof of Lemma 7.
4.3 Optimally Taxing Subnetworks with Heterogeneous Players
With the help of Algorithm 3, we can also compute an optimal solution to the taxing
subnetworks problem on parallel-arc networks with heterogeneous players. We compute this
optimal flow in polynomial time by the following steps: Run Algorithm 3 on the given network
with k players and θ-restrictions as given. This returns a flow (fa)a∈A. We decompose this
arc flow into a player flow (f i)i∈[k] by assigning the most sensitive players to the arcs in N
arbitrarily and the remaining players to the arcs in T using the canonical decomposition
described in Section 3.2.
I Theorem 10. The process described above generates an optimal θ-restricted flow.
Proof. First we show that the flow is inducible by tolls on T . Run Algorithm 3 on the network
({s, t}, T ) to define tolls on arcs T . Since the canonical decomposition decomposes the flow
on T , these tolls discourage players on T to change to a different arc in T . Furthermore, the
maximum latency arc aˆ in T+ has a zero toll. Now note that for the flow f to be inducible in
the homogeneous case, for every a ∈ N, a¯ ∈ A+ it must hold that `a(fa + 1) ≥ `a¯(fa¯). Since
players on T have no incentive to switch to aˆ, they surely do not have any incentive to switch
to an arc in N . Now consider the players on N . They would not change to another arc in
N , or f would not be in equilibrium. Let a′ be the maximum latency arc in A+. Suppose
a′ ∈ N . We impose an additional toll to all arcs in T of max{`a′(fa′)− `aˆ(faˆ)/α¯, 0}, where
α¯ := mini:a(i)∈N αi denotes the minimum sensitivity amongst players on N . Then the cost
that a player on N sees on aˆ is at least
`aˆ(faˆ) + α¯ · `a
′(fa′)− `aˆ(faˆ)
α¯
= `a′(fa′).
Since the players on aˆ have no incentive to change to other arcs in T , neither do players in
N , as their sensitivity to toll is at least as high. Because this extra toll is added to all arcs
in T , the players on T are still in equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary user i that uses an arc
in T . Then on arc aˆ it sees cost of at most
αi · `a
′(fa′)− `aˆ(faˆ)
α¯
+ `aˆ(faˆ) ≤ `a′(fa′)− `aˆ(faˆ) + `aˆ(faˆ) = `a′(fa′),
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so no player on T has an incentive to switch to N . Now let the maximum latency arc a′ ∈ T .
Then aˆ = a′. Because the players on T cannot gain by deviating to a different arc in T , for
some player i ∈ [k] such that a(i) = aˆ,
αi · τa + `a(fa) ≥ `aˆ(faˆ) ∀a ∈ T.
Since α¯ > αi, for every user on some a¯ ∈ N
α¯ · τa + `a(fa) ≥ αi · τa + `a(fa) ≥ `aˆ(faˆ) ≥ `a¯(fa¯) ∀a ∈ T.
So the decomposed flow is inducible by tolls.
It remains to prove optimality. Take an optimal solution to the heterogeneous variant of the
problem. Again we know that for every a ∈ N, a¯ ∈ A+ it must hold that `a(fa+1) ≥ `a¯(fa¯), or
it can never be induced by tolls which are zero on N . For arc flow f ′ defined by f ′a :=
∑k
i=1 f
i
a,
the component-wise minimal tolls that induce these are equal to max{0, `aˆ(faˆ)− `a(fa + 1)}
for a ∈ A. Then for a ∈ N , τa = 0. So the minimum cost solution to the heterogeneous
problem is at most that of the homogeneous variant, which proves optimality. J
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